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This paper addresses the selection problem in promotion tournaments. I consider a situation 
with heterogeneous employees and ask whether an employer might be interested in repeating a 
promotion tournament. On the one hand, this yields a reduction in uncertainty over the 
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1.  Introduction 
In practice, tournaments are very famous since they help to determine the most able competitor 
in a simple way and, therefore, to weaken problems due to informational asymmetries. 
Consider, for example, a company trying to fill a vacancy on a high hierarchy level but not 
knowing the abilities of the lower-level employees. Clearly, this company wishes to fill the 
vacancy with a rather able employee, since an unable employee might perform badly and, 
hence, might influence the company’s profit in an unfavourable way. One possibility for this 
company is to arrange an inner-company promotion tournament.
1 Since an able employee is 
more likely to win the tournament than an unable employee, the asymmetry problem would be 
weakened. However, the tournament’s outcome might be affected by luck or random 
components. So, the probability that an unable employee wins the tournament and the company 
promotes the “wrong” one is positive. 
There is only little literature discussing this selection problem in tournaments.
2 For example, 
Meyer (1991) considers a series of promotion tournaments between two heterogeneous 
employees. She demonstrates that the problem of incorrect promotion decisions may be 
weakened by biasing the tournament’s results. The bias (that in most cases favours the actual 
leader in the tournament) increases the tournament’s information content. Yet, the less able 
employee still may be promoted. Clark and Riis (2001) show that the problem of incorrect 
promotion decisions can be solved by combining a promotion tournament with several test 
standards. In their model, there are three tournament prizes, and the tournament’s winner 
receives the highest prize only if he additionally passes two tests. By using the test standards, 
the employer receives further information about the employees` abilities. With this 
information, the selection problem might be solved completely. In contrast, Hvide and 
Kristiansen (2003) emphasise the relevance of the selection problem. They examine a 
                                                 
1 In this work, I do not analyse whether a tournament is optimal in the class of all contracts. I assume that the 
company uses a promotion tournament to fill a vacancy because of its practicability and ask how to improve it. 
2 The literature on rank-order tournaments mostly focuses on the use of tournaments as incentive scheme. See, 
e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) or Rosen (1986).   3
promotion tournament in which the employees are able to choose strategies of different risk. In 
this case the selection problem is quite relevant, since a low-ability employee might choose a 
very risky strategy and so wins the tournament with a (strictly) positive probability. 
This paper regards a different and more practical instrument to weaken the selection problem. 
This instrument is very successful in sports. Most tournaments in sports are characterised by 
the existence of repeating competition, i.e., players compete more than one time. In this case, 
the tournament`s winner is the player that has the highest success on average. For example, in 
golf
3, the competitors play 18 holes, and the winner is the player that needs the fewest shots to 
pocket the golf ball in all 18 holes.
4 Imagine an extreme situation in which the competitors play 
only one hole to identify the most able player. In this situation, the quality of the tournament’s 
results is very doubtful. An able player might have unfavourable conditions (e.g. strong wind 
or rain) and, therefore, needs more shots than a less able competitor playing under good 
conditions. In the contrary extreme situation, the number of competitions between the golf 
players would be infinitely large. The law of large numbers then predicts that the tournament’s 
winner is surely the most able player, so the selection problem would be solved. However, it is 
arguably impossible to golf an infinitely high number of holes. 
In this paper, the repetition mechanism is transferred to an inner-company promotion 
tournament. An employer decides about the number of tournaments he arranges between two 
heterogeneous employees. On the one hand, it is costly for the employer to operate more than 
one tournament, since he wishes to fill a vacant workplace. On the other hand, extending the 
number of tournaments reduces uncertainty about the employees` abilities. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 contains the description of the 
model. In section 3, the model is solved. In particular, it is shown under what circumstances 
                                                 
3 Other examples may include sports like tennis, table-tennis, chess or cycling. 
4 The primary aim of repetition in sports is to entertain spectators for a certain period rather to solve the selection-
problem. Yet clearly, repeating competition lessens this problem.   4
the employer is interested in repeating the tournament. Concluding remarks are offered in 
section 4. 
 
2.  Description of the model and notation 
I consider a risk-neutral principal arranging a series of k tournaments between two 
heterogeneous and non risk-loving employees. Without loss of generality, employee 1 is the 
more able one with ability  H a  and employee 2 is the less able one with ability  L a () L H a a > . I 
define  L H a a −  as  a ∆ . A situation with asymmetric information is assumed such that each 
employee knows her own ability and the ability of her opponent, while the employer only 
knows that there is one able employee with ability  H a  and one unable employee with ability 
L a . Both employees might presently work in the same department of their company and, for 
this reason, are able to estimate the abilities of each other in a detailed way, while the employer 
naturally has less information about his employees` abilities. Each tournament lasts one period. 
The employee attaining the highest aggregate output will be promoted to a vacant workplace at 
a higher level in the company. This workplace is already vacant when the first tournament 
starts. Therefore, the net profit of the company from this workplace is zero in each period 
during the tournament. If the able employee is promoted, this profit will be  0 > Θ  in each 
period, otherwise it will be again zero.
5 The company and the two employees discount future 
utilities with  1 r ≤ . Their time horizon is infinite. Intuitively, r could be interpreted as the 
probability that employee i (i=1,2) continues to work for the company in the next period. 
Equation (1) describes the performance of employee i in the tournament in period j (j=1,…,k), 
ij y . It is given by the sum of the effort  ij e  he has chosen in this tournament, his ability  i a  and a 
random noise  ij ε . 
                                                 
5 It is assumed that an employee on the higher level receives a wage of w, while he receives a wage of zero on the 
lower level. At the beginning of the tournament, the high-level workplace is vacant and so, during the tournament, 
nothing is produced on the workplace and no wage is paid. Thus the profit is clearly zero. Furthermore, one could 
think that in case of promotion, a low-ability employee would produce output worth w and a high-ability 
employee would produce output worth  w w > Θ + in each period.   5
(1)  ij i ij ij a e y ε + + = . 
It is assumed that these performances do not increase the company’s profits. They are only 
useful as a signalling instrument.
6 The random components  ij ε  are uncorrelated and follow a 
normal distribution with mean zero and variance 
2 σ . Using equation (1), the winning-
probability of employee 1 in a k-period tournament is given by (2): 
(2) 
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In this context,  k F  stands for the distribution function of the composed random variable 
() () H L
k
1 j
j 1 j 2 a a k − ⋅ + ε − ε ∑
=
, while  k f  denotes the corresponding density function. Effort 
entails disutility for an employee which is given by  ( ) ij e C  with  ( ) 0 0 C = ,  ( ) 0 e C ij > ′  and 
( ) 0 e C ij > ′ ′ . In case of promotion, the promoted employee in each period receives an income w. 
It is further assumed that an employees` utility is additively separable in income and costs. 
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Lastly, the employer does not announce intermediate results, i.e., in a given tournament, the 
employees do not know the results of the previous tournaments. 
 
3.  Solution to the model 
                                                 
6 One could justify this assumption as follows: The profits that could be generated on the primary level are so low 
compared to the ones on the higher level that they are of (almost) no importance. Alternatively, as in Clark and 
Riis (2001), one could think of the model as a hiring process in which the company arranges a series of (valueless) 
tests in order to experience the abilities of the potential employees.   6
In a k-period tournament, employees 1 and 2 solve maximisation problems (3) and (4), 
respectively: 
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. 
Using backwards induction, the employees` efforts in the last tournament have to be 
determined first. The first-order conditions for these efforts are given by (5) and (6): 
(5)  () () () 0 e C
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From the first-order conditions, we see that both employees choose the same effort, thus we 
have  k k 2 k 1 e : e e = = . Analogously, continuing backwards induction up to the first tournament, 
we see that this symmetry holds in every tournament, so for all j=1,…,k we have 
j j 2 j 1 e : e e = = . On that account, the winning probability of the high-ability employee 1 in a k-











0 Fk  where  () ⋅ Φ  denotes the distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. It is then straightforward to derive proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: The winning probability of the high-ability employee is strictly increasing in k. 
 
Extending the number of tournaments from k to k+1 has two countervailing effects on the 
winning probability of employee 1. On the one hand, abstracting from random factors, the 
                                                 
7 As in Lazear and Rosen (1981), the second-order conditions will hold and so an equilibrium will exist if the 
variance 
2 σ  is sufficiently large. Intuitively, an equilibrium will only exist if luck plays a significant role. In what 
follows, the existence of an equilibrium is assumed.   7
difference between the two employees` performances increases from  a k ∆ ⋅  to () a 1 k ∆ ⋅ + . 
Hence, employee 1 is more likely to be promoted. On the other hand, the influence of random 
factors increases, too. The variance of each individual’s performance rises from 
2 k σ ⋅  to 
()
2 1 k σ ⋅ + , so employee 1 is less likely to be promoted. However, the first effect outbalances 
the second one, and so the winning probability of the able employee increases when the 
number of tournaments gets higher. For  ∞ → k ,  ( ) 0 Fk  equals one. The selection problem 
would be completely eliminated by infinitely repeating the promotion tournament. 
Extending the number of tournaments is advantageous for the employer, since an incorrect 
promotion decision becomes less likely. Yet, it is also disadvantageous. The employer looses 
potential payoffs, since the workplace stays vacant for a longer time.  In order to clearly 
understand how the employer decides and how the model parameters influence his decision, we 
restrict his possible actions. Particularly, we assume that the employer has to decide between 
arranging m or m+1 tournaments, where m is an integer and positive number. In this case he 
prefers m+1 tournaments, if the condition  m , emp 1 m , emp EU EU > +  holds. This condition is 
rewritten in (7): 


































From (7), I derive proposition 2 where I define  σ ∆ = a : y :
8 
 
Proposition 2. If the employer has the possibility to arrange m or m+1 promotion tournaments, 
there exists a cut-off  () () ( ) 1 , m 1 m r ~ 5 . 0 − + ∈  such that the following will hold: 
(i)  For  r ~ r < , the employer always arranges m tournaments. 
(ii)  For  r ~ r > , there are two cut-offs  0 y ˆ >  and  0 y ~ >  with  y ~ y ˆ <  such that the 
employer arranges m+1 tournaments only if  [ ] y ~ , y ˆ y∈ . 
                                                 
8 The proof of proposition 2 is placed in the Appendix.   8
 
In case of a small r, the employer assigns a high value to present payoffs but not to future 
payoffs. So he will never arrange a further tournament, since the profits in period m+1 are too 
valuable for him. 
For r higher than  r ~ , it is also worthwhile for the employer to care for future payoffs. In this 
case, it might be beneficial to arrange more than m tournaments in order to reduce uncertainty 
about the employees` abilities. As stated in proposition 2, the employer’s decision in the case 
r ~ r >  depends on the ratio  σ ∆a . 
For a small  a ∆  (or a large σ), one could think that the employer decides to arrange a further 
tournament. The employees are very similar in their abilities and, hence, it is quite likely that 
arranging only m tournaments yields an incorrect promotion decision. Surprisingly, the 
employer does not so. The reason is as follows: Even if a further tournament was arranged, 
employee 1 is only little more likely to be promoted than employee 2. Due to the small ability 
difference (or the large impact of random components) a tournament in period m+1 would not 
entail very much new information about the two employees. Therefore, the disadvantage of lost 
profits prevails, and the employer decides not to repeat the tournament. For intermediate values 
of  a ∆  and σ, the argumentation is contrary. In this case the use of another tournament leads to 
much more information about the employees` abilities. Hence it is beneficial to repeat the 
promotion tournament to accumulate more data about the employees` abilities. Lastly, for a 
large  a ∆  (or a small σ), the high-ability employee is very likely to be the leader after the first 
m tournaments. Arranging a further tournament would only yield little new information and, 
therefore, the employer again decides not do so. 
Moreover, note that the interval in which the cut-off  r ~  lies, gets smaller as m becomes higher. 
Obviously, the degree of new information when arranging one more tournament is higher in 
case of little prior tournaments than in case of many. Therefore, as m becomes higher, the 
employer is less likely to arrange a further tournament.   9
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper addressed the selection problem in promotion tournaments. It was analysed, 
whether an employer might prefer to arrange a series of promotion tournaments instead of 
arranging only one tournament. Thereby, it was shown that extending the number of 
tournaments always leads to more detailed information about the employees’ abilities. 
However, this information advantage may be outbalanced by vacancy costs that arise when the 
number of tournaments is increased. 
Comparing the employer’s expected utilities of arranging m or m+1 tournaments, offers further 
interesting results. When the employer is quite impatient, he always decides to arrange only m 
tournaments. When he is rather patient, his decision depends on the amount of new information 
another tournament entails. This new information depends non-monotonously on the ratio of 
the two agents’ ability difference and the error term’s standard deviation. For a very small or a 
very large ratio, the amount of new information is rather small, for intermediate values it is 




In this appendix, proposition 2 is proved. 





















Φ ⇔ > +  
In the extreme cases  0 y =  and  ∞ → y , this condition is not satisfied. 




















































































































. This derivative is positive if 
the following condition holds: 
() () () ( ) ( ) 2 r m 1 m ln y y 25 . 0 r m 1 m ln m r 1 m e
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We see that  () () () 2 r m 1 m ln y
5 . 0 * ⋅ ⋅ + =  is the maximum of H. Inserting 
* y  into H yields: 
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This maximum is strictly negative for  ( ) ( )
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− + = , but strictly positive for r=1. The 
derivative of  ( )
* y H  with respect to r is given by: 
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This derivative is positive if the difference between the second and the third term is non-
negative, i.e., if the subsequent condition holds: 
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 is positive. Since  ( )
* y H  is positive for r=1, there must be 
some cut-off value  r ~ , at which  ( )
* y H  becomes positive. Hence, proposition 2 is proved. 
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